Connecticut College

Digital Commons @ Connecticut College
German Studies Honors Papers

German Studies Department

2022

Germany, but Normal: Radical Right Populism in Eastern Germany
Jordan Groff

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.conncoll.edu/germhp
This Honors Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the German Studies Department at Digital
Commons @ Connecticut College. It has been accepted for inclusion in German Studies Honors Papers by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Connecticut College. For more information, please contact
bpancier@conncoll.edu.
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author.

Germany, but Normal: Radical Right Populism in Eastern
Germany
Jordan Groff

Honors Thesis
German Studies Department
CISLA Senior Integrative Project
Connecticut College

2
Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................................... 3
INTRODUCTION: A NEW PARTY JOINS THE BUNDESTAG .................................................................. 4
CHAPTER 1: WHAT DOES THE AFD REPRESENT?............................................................................. 12
Other Radical Right Parties in Germany .............................................................................................................. 13
Economic Policy and the EU ................................................................................................................................ 15
How the ‘Refugee Crisis’ Changed the AfD .......................................................................................................... 18
Immigration Politics of the AfD........................................................................................................................... 22
AfD’s Stance on COVID-19 .................................................................................................................................. 26

CHAPTER 2: WHAT ATTRACTS AFD VOTERS? .................................................................................. 30
Support for the AfD between 2013 and 2015 ...................................................................................................... 32
Radicalization ..................................................................................................................................................... 35
Culture or Economics? The AfD as a Protest Party .............................................................................................. 37

CHAPTER 3: THE LEGACY OF THE GDR AND THE POWER OF MEMORY ......................................... 41
The Radical Right in the GDR .............................................................................................................................. 42
Ghosts of the Past .............................................................................................................................................. 45
The Police State .................................................................................................................................................. 50

CHAPTER 4: THE LEGACY OF REUNIFICATION ................................................................................. 54
Overview of Reunification .................................................................................................................................. 55
Protest Voting in the Aftermath of Reunification ................................................................................................ 59
The AfD as a Protest Party .................................................................................................................................. 64

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE AFD......................................................................................... 67
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................. 71

3

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank many people who have helped me with this project along the way.
First, none of this would have been possible without my thesis advisor, Professor Machtans, who
met with me nearly every week this academic year. She gave me feedback on my work every
step of the way, helped me flesh out my ideas, and helped me find relevant sources. I would also
like to thank Professor Knott, my Major advisor in the German Studies Department, and
Professor Atherton, whose classes in the German Department were very influential for my ideas.
I also could not have done this work without the CISLA program, which got me thinking about
this project even as early as my sophomore year. In this program, I would especially like to thank
Professor Lanoux, Mary Devins, Cara Masullo-Ekwuabu, Betsy Lebel, and Anissa Cantone.
Finally, I would like to thank my friends who have accompanied me in the library and elsewhere
to make this whole process enjoyable.

4

Introduction: A New Party Joins the Bundestag
In 2017, the German political establishment received a rude awakening. A new party was
elected to the German parliament, the Bundestag, for the first time since the 1990s. The
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) received 12.6 percent of the national vote, well over the 5
percent threshold that German parties must meet in order to be represented in the Bundestag.
This was enough for it to become the third largest party in Germany and the leader of the
parliamentary opposition. Up until this election, no party to the right of the CDU/CSU had ever
experienced such success in a national election in postwar Germany, which had made Germany
somewhat of an anomaly among its peers in Europe. After the 2017 election, the AfD had proven
that the Federal Republic of Germany was not immune to right-wing extremism.
The AfD formed in late 2012 in opposition to the Euro. They were a conservative, populist
party from the start—even in the name, ‘alternative’ implies an alternative to the establishment—
but they were not originally an extremist party. However, they would continuously radicalize
over the following years, and by 2017, they were widely recognized as a radical right party.1
How this radicalization happened and continues to happen is one of the primary subjects of this
thesis. Angela Merkel’s decision to open Germany to hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers
from the Middle East and North Africa in 2015 resulted in the AfD taking a much harsher stance
on immigration, refugees, and Islam, and this shift to the right has continued to the present.
Messages exchanged in AfD chat rooms show the extent of bigotry in the most extreme wings of
the party. In these chat rooms, AfD members and politicians express the fear that “Germany is
becoming an Islamic republic” along with explicitly racist ideas of ‘Muslim No-Go-Areas,’
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Kai Arzheimer and Carl C. Berning, “How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Their Voters Veered to the
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while asylum seekers are said to be “invaders in Europe” and “dirt, garbage, not white, not
German.”2 Publicly, there have also been numerous incidents of high-ranking party officials
making extremist and racist statements. One of the most radical AfD politicians is Björn Höcke,
the head of the party in Thuringia, who has called for a “180-degree turn” on the issue of
Holocaust remembrance and atonement and maligned the Holocaust memorial in Berlin as a
“monument of shame.”3 The co-chair of the party, Frauke Petry, has said that officers should
“use firearms if necessary” to “prevent illegal border crossings.”4 Many other party officials have
made similar statements regarding immigrants.
The rise of the AfD is accompanied by and closely related to a rise in right-wing extremism
in Germany. According to the Mitte-Studie of 2020-2021, an annual study which attempts to
measure the state of the political center of German society, Germany has experienced more rightwing extremist violence in the past few years than any other European country.5 One attack
which signaled this rise occurred in Hanau on February 19, 2020. The perpetrator believed he
was fighting a ‘race war’ and that by committing the attack, he was defending a white male race
whose dominance he considered to be threatened. Other prominent examples include the antiSemitic attack in a Synagogue in Halle on October 9, 2019, as well as the murder of the district
president of Cassel, Walter Lübcke on June 2, 2019.6 Rhetoric from AfD politicians often echo
the assumptions of extremists such as those who committed these crimes. For instance,
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Alexander Gauland, the former chair of the party, called Merkel’s immigration policies “a policy
of flooding” and an “attempt to replace the German people through an arriving population from
all parts of the world.”7
Despite the far-right’s disapproval, Merkel retired as an enormously popular figure in
Germany. However, the 2021 election in September marked the end of the streak of the Christian
Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) as the largest party in the Bundestag.
The Social Democratic Party (SPD) overtook the CDU with 25.7 percent of the vote, compared
with 24.1 percent for the CDU/CSU. The Greens also earned 14.8 percent of the vote, marking a
5.8 percent increase from 2017 and the best electoral performance they have ever had. The
Bundestag itself is also more diverse than ever: about 11.3 percent of elected representatives
have a migration background (Migrationshintergrund), 3 percent more than the previous
Bundestag.8 The AfD received 10.3 percent of the vote, losing 2.3 percent from 2017. They were
surpassed by both the Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and have gone from being
the third largest party to the fifth. This election also marks the first national election since the
founding of the party in which the AfD has lost votes. Although this might seem like a poor
performance, the party had a relatively positive outlook on the results. In an interview, Tino
Chrupalla, the co-chair of the party, said that he considered any result over 10 percent to be
good, considering that it meant that the other parties had failed to significantly diminish the
AfD’s appeal to its base.9 Jörg Meuthen, another co-leader at the time, said the results proved
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that the party had ‘stabilized.’10 As a whole, the party considers the election to be stable, solid,
and “not a defeat.”11
While the AfD is strong throughout Germany, it is especially strong in the East. That being
said, it has massively outperformed the best results of all other radical right parties in the
Western Bundesländer (states). Additionally, the AfD has received more votes in raw numbers in
the West than in the East due to the West’s much higher population. However, a significantly
higher percent of the vote in the eastern Bundesländer goes to the AfD. In 2021, the AfD earned
18.9 percent of the vote in the East, 5.2 percent behind the SPD and 1.8 percent ahead of the
CDU. In the former West, it received 8.2 percent—still a sizable result, but nowhere near the
success in the East. In the Southeastern Bundesländer of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia,
they were the winners of the Zweitstimmen (the vote Germans cast for the party they want
represented in the Bundestag). The AfD placed second with a strong performance in the
northeastern states of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Brandenburg. It received between
16 and 25 percent of the vote in most northeastern electoral districts. The expansive voter base
that the AfD has built up in the East means that the AfD is likely to remain a significant player in
German politics for the foreseeable future.
What explains the success of the AfD in eastern Germany over the past decade? Much
research has been done on the motivation of populist-right movements, as well as on the AfD
specifically. In general, explanations for these movements fall into one of two main categories:
cultural grievances or socioeconomic deprivation. However, these explanations fail to explain
the whole picture of the AfD’s success in the East specifically. On one hand, those who favor
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cultural explanations tend to emphasize right-wing positions on controversial issues as the most
important predictor of support for the AfD. While right-wing ideology is certainly correlated
with support for the AfD, this conclusion is neither surprising nor helpful because it does not
explain the prevalence of these right-wing ideas in the first place. The AfD openly supports
right-wing positions, so it should come as no surprise that their voters also hold right-wing
positions. On the other hand, socioeconomic status has an indirect influence on the likelihood of
an individual to vote for the AfD at best. The party also does not market itself using policies that
would help the poor, preferring to fear-monger and scapegoat marginalized groups.
I attempt to explain the source of right-wing attitudes with a special focus on the different
experiences of people living in the former East German states, or the ‘new states’ (neue
Bundesländer). I conclude that the AfD’s appeal in the East is better thought of in terms of two
historical legacies: the legacy of the East German state—the German Democratic Republic
(GDR)—and the legacy of reunification. The appeal of an anti-establishment protest party like
the AfD is deeply embedded in the experiences and psyche of the people it tries to appeal to.
This does not mean that AfD voters would loyally vote for the AfD forever, but rather that their
mindset makes them more prone to support a party like the AfD. This mindset is influenced by
the legacy of the GDR and of reunification, which makes their electoral choice difficult for
outside observers to understand. Even for eastern Germans who grew up after reunification, the
experience of growing up around those who were directly influenced by these historical legacies
has a significant impact on their political and personal beliefs.
This thesis is divided into four chapters: chapter 1 covers the history of the AfD and the
issues that the AfD has represented; chapter 2 reviews different attempts to explain the AfD’s
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appeal; chapter 3 discusses the historical legacy of the GDR; and chapter 4 covers the legacy and
aftermath of reunification.
The first chapter gives an overview of the history, policies, and rhetoric of the AfD. This
chapter focuses on the three most important issues for the AfD in chronological order. In the first
stage of the party, economic policy and euro-skepticism were the driving forces of the party. The
second stage featured an increased focus on anti-immigration and anti-Islam policies and
rhetoric, accompanied by a decisive shift to the right. The third stage features the entrance of the
COVID-19 pandemic as an issue, which the AfD has not hesitated to use to garner populist
support. This chapter clarifies the question of what the AfD stands for and what issues it focuses
has focused on throughout its lifetime.
The second chapter reviews different attempts to explain the AfD’s appeal. It discusses how
the leadership of AfD radicalized over time and how this radicalization affected who voted for
the party. Then, it moves to the difficult task of explaining why people vote for the AfD—and
for radical right populist parties in general—focusing on the cultural backlash hypothesis and the
economic insecurity hypothesis, theorized by Inglehart and Norris.12 Proponents of the cultural
backlash hypothesis argue that right-wing ideology is the best predictor of support for the AfD.
They point to the lack of correlation between statistics like unemployment and income level with
the likelihood of an AfD vote, arguing that the most important determinants of a vote for the AfD
are attitudes towards immigrants and attitudes towards democracy.13 Others argue that economic
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grievances are essential to understanding the appeal of the AfD, highlighting issues such
economic disparity between the East and West, underrepresentation of eastern Germans in
politics and business, and problems with the economic integration of East Germany in the
reunification process.14
The third chapter discusses the historical legacy of the GDR and how it shapes the
populist appeal of the AfD. I focus on three elements in particular: first, the resurgence of the
radical right towards the end of the GDR; second, the official memory policy dictated by the
Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the national mythology they tried to implement; and third, the
GDR as a police state under the Ministry for State Security, more commonly known as the Stasi.
Then, I connect these aspects of the GDR’s legacy with the AfD, showing how the AfD appeals
specifically to these memories. Especially important are the differences in the memorialization of
the second World War in East and West Germany and how the different politics of memory in
the two states have contributed to different attitudes and assumptions toward democratic values,
nationalism, and racism.
The fourth chapter discusses the legacy and aftermath of the reunification process and
how reunification resulted in persistent grievances in the East. This chapter provides an overview
of the events of 1989 and 1990 that led to reunification, focusing on the experiences of East
Germans themselves, for many of whom this period was extremely confusing and emotional.
Then, I move to the aftermath of reunification and describe the socioeconomic disparities that
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persisted and developed in the following decades. This also includes policies that exacerbated
distrust of the government in the East, such as the Hartz IV reforms of 2004, which led to
widespread protests in eastern German cities. To better understand the AfD’s appeal in eastern
Germany, this chapter and the previous one take a historical approach that incorporates the
legacy of both the GDR itself and the legacy of the reunification process.
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Chapter 1: What does the AfD Represent?
The question of what the AfD represents may receive a wildly different answer
depending on who you ask. To many Germans, it represents a threat to democracy and the
dangers of resurging nationalism. To its supporters, it may represent a return to neoliberal,
laissez-faire economics, a defense of German national identity, or a means to end unnecessary
pandemic restrictions. However, the populist appeal of the party lies in something more allencompassing than far-right ideology or specific policy positions. Most supporters of the AfD
are attracted to the party because it makes them feel represented, or alternatively, because they
do not feel represented by the other parties. This feeling of representation may be closely related
to the issues the AfD chooses to focus on, but the decision to vote for the AfD is not necessarily
an ideological one.
In this chapter, I focus on the origin of the party and the policies it has represented
throughout its lifetime. The purpose is to analyze the issues that have been most important in
attracting voters to the party. The European financial crisis was the issue that sparked the
founding of the AfD, so naturally the party’s policy towards the EU is an attractive point to its
voters. The second issue is migration. In the aftermath of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015,
the AfD was able to garner a lot of support by radicalizing its immigration politics and fanning
the flames of a growing anti-Islam nationalist sentiment. Finally, I argue that the COVID-19
pandemic has provided the AfD with a third core issue to attract populist support. The AfD has
consistently opposed pandemic restrictions, such as lockdowns, mask mandates, and vaccine
mandates. The longer the pandemic drags on, the more popular these positions become. People
yearn for a return to normal, and ‘normal’ is what the AfD’s slogan emphasizes: Deutschland,
aber normal. Germany, but normal.

13

Other Radical Right Parties in Germany
It is important to put the AfD in the context of other far-right German parties to
understand what makes it exceptional. Other than the AfD, the most notable radical right parties
in the Federal Republic have been the National Democratic Party (NPD), the Republicans
(Republikaner), and the German People’s Union (DVU). These parties all had some success in
state elections, but never received enough support to enter the national parliament. They never
experienced the same success as the AfD or other radical right parties in Western Europe, such
as the Rassemblement nationale (national rally) in France, the Freedom Party in Austria, Vlaams
Belang (Flemish Interest) in Belgium, and the Danish People’s Party.
German radical right parties have faced strong opposition in public discourse, in large
part because of the lingering memory of National Socialism. However, they have still appealed
to some fringe extremists in the West and the East. The eastern authoritarian state repressed NeoNazi groups, as it did with all political dissenters. In the West, some neo-Nazi groups were
banned, but there was more room for right-wing extremists to organize. The first notable farright party of the new Federal Republic was the NPD, formed in 1964. At its strongest in 1969, it
had 30,000 members and was most successful in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Lower Saxony,
and Hesse, but it slowly lost support over the following decades. After reunification however, the
NPD gained a bit of momentum. Like the AfD, the NPD had its most notable results in the East:
in Saxony, it received 9.2 percent of the vote in the 2004 state election, and in MecklenburgWestern Pomerania, it received 7.3 percent in 2006. The NPD still campaigns there to this day:
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their posters can be seen in the leadup to every state and national election. Their best nationwide
result occurred in the 2005 Bundestagswahl, in which it received a mere 1.6 percent.15
The German Republicans were founded in 1983 and were originally successful in the
Southern states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. They understood themselves as a party
‘right of center’ and, like the AfD, claimed to support democratic values, describing themselves
as a nationalistic and ‘law and order’ party. In this way, they differed from their competitors—
the NPD and the DVU—which were more openly extremist. In 1989, they reached 7.5 percent in
the Berlin state elections: the first time a far-right party was represented in a German state
parliament since the NPD at the end of the 1960s. In the 1990s, the Republikaner had short-lived
success in Baden-Württemberg: they won 10.9 percent of the vote in 1992 and 9.1 percent in
1996, after which they failed to surpass the 5 percent threshold. Despite minimal successes, they
have been consistently active in elections across the country.16
Finally, the DVU was founded in 1987. Its first successes came in Bremen, when it
entered the state parliament in 1987 and 1991. In 1992, it was successful in Schleswig-Holstein
with 6.3 percent of the vote, but it failed to repeat that success. Once again, the strength of the
DVU proved to be in the East. In Saxony-Anhalt, it had the best result of any radical right party
in postwar Germany until the AfD, with 12.9 percent of the statewide vote. In Brandenburg as
well, the DVU was represented in the Landtag (regional parliament) from 1999 until 2009. The
DVU, like the NPD, spoke directly to East Germans who felt underappreciated in their new
country, taking advantage of the potential for protest voting in the East, much like the AfD over
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the past decade.17 The history of these parties shows the context of German right-wing
extremism in which the AfD was formed.

Economic Policy and the EU
Unlike these other radical right parties, the AfD was not founded as an extremist party.
Although it is now known for its extreme anti-immigration and anti-Islam politics, the party was
founded in response to Angela Merkel’s handling of the European economic and financial crisis,
which began in 2008. Ultimately, Merkel made the decision to bail out Greece and other EU
states with a trillion-dollar bailout package, which included German-imposed austerity measures
designed to prevent the crisis from reoccurring. However, the bailout package violated the
Maastricht Treaty and angered many German economists who felt that she had betrayed German
values and the German constitution.18 In 2012, Alexander Gauland, Konrad Adam, and Bernd
Lucke formed the Wahlalternative 2013 (2013 Electoral Alternative), which would later become
the AfD. Their main policy goal was to abolish the Euro as a currency and to promote economic
liberalism within the EU, which is shown in their 2013 manifesto.19 The AfD’s 2013 manifesto
was only a few pages long—much shorter than most. It focused on policies transitioning away
from the Euro, returning to national currencies or smaller currency unions. It emphasizes “a
Europe of sovereign states” with a shared domestic market.20
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One especially notable section of the 2013 manifesto is called “Constitutionality and
Democracy” (Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie). Most supporters of democracy would agree
that nothing in this section is objectionable on the surface, but based on what the AfD chose to
emphasize, we can make some assumptions as to who it was trying to appeal to in 2013.
Merkel’s bailout package in response to the financial crisis was clearly on the authors’ minds as
they wrote this section. They write, “the people should determine the will of the parties, not the
other way around.”21 The founders of the AfD were clearly angered by Merkel’s politics and
viewed her as authoritarian. This rhetoric appealed especially to conservative CDU supporters
who felt betrayed by Merkel and by those who already felt unrepresented by the parties, two
groups who would support the AfD in this election and future elections.22 The last bullet point of
this section of the 2013 manifesto is also interesting: pledging to discuss ‘unconventional
opinions’ openly (as long as they do not go against the constitution). While support for freedom
of speech in itself is not generally a controversial topic, the term ‘unconventional opinions’ gives
a definitive nod towards extremists.
The AfD received a lot of media attention in the leadup to the 2013 Bundestagswahl.
According to Charles Lees, their founders were “well informed and well networked, and their
joint manifesto was endorsed by an impressive array of economists, journalists, business leaders,
and political activists, many of whom were former members of the CDU.”23 Despite this, the
AfD failed to attract five percent of the vote in the 2013 German elections, meaning that it would
not be represented in the Bundestag. However, this was a remarkable result for such a new party,
and it was more than enough to keep the AfD in the national conversation.
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The next opportunity for the new party to prove itself was the 2014 European Parliament
election. In this election, it won 7.1 percent of the national vote, improving on its result from the
previous year. Like the previous year, their 2014 manifesto focuses primarily on the
decentralization of the EU.24 However, it was much longer and more extensive than the previous
year’s iteration. It used populist language to criticize powerful European institutions, such as the
European Central Bank, the European Commission, the European Stabilization Mechanism, and
the Bank Union, which, according to the AfD, are growing in influence after the financial crisis
and subsequent bailout. The manifesto states that these institutions were growing “without
democratic control” and becoming increasingly out of touch (bürgerfern).
The rest of the 2014 manifesto mostly expands on this fundamental criticism. The second
section focuses on the Euro, making the case that the common currency of Europe was a
fundamental cause of the debt crisis. The AfD criticizes the German government for being one of
the biggest supporters of the Euro and for meddling in the affairs of southern European states.
Specifically, they argue that a European common currency is harmful because individual states
cannot adjust their own interest rates or exchange rates based on their own needs. As a result, the
Euro is overvalued in southern Europe and in France while simultaneously undervalued in
Germany. Therefore, German taxpayers must (unfairly) carry the burden of financial crises in
southern Europe. The AfD sees this as evidence that an abrupt and chaotic end to the Euro is not
unlikely. To avoid this, they argue that a gradual and controlled transition away from the Euro.25
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How the ‘Refugee Crisis’ Changed the AfD
If the financial crisis was the issue that sparked the AfD, the ‘refugee crisis’ during the
summer of 2015 was the one that intensified its radicalization process. The AfD already
represented a harsh stance on immigration prior to 2015, but after 2015, immigration became the
party’s central issue. The term ‘refugee crisis’ (Flüchtlingskrise) refers to the arrival of millions
of refugees in Europe beginning in 2015. That year, 890,000 people arrived in Germany to seek
asylum, mostly from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In the beginning, German society proved to be
remarkably welcoming towards refugees. Media coverage was surprisingly positive which led to
the development of a ‘culture of welcome’ (Willkommenskultur). However, the positivity was
short-lived, and the issue was increasingly framed in a crisis narrative. Pundits warned that the
number of refugees entering Europe, specifically Germany and Sweden, would rise to three
million in 2016, making it easier for the AfD and other right-wing groups to capitalize on
political backlash to refugee acceptance. This led to the prevalence of the term ‘refugee crisis,’
both in English and in German. This term made it easy for critics of Angela Merkel’s policy of
welcome to denounce the issue as “Germany’s descent from supposed order into chaos and
emergency.”26
As refugees arrived in Europe, media coverage of their suffering encouraged political
leaders such as Angela Merkel to act. Stories of asylum seekers in crowded detention camps in
Budapest showed the inadequacy of Europe’s asylum regime. Other stories appeared so tragic
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that they automatically drew attention to the plight of refugees. Stories such as 71 dead bodies of
refugees that were trapped in a locked van on the A4 motorway in Austria or the heartbreaking
story and pictures documenting the death of Alan Kurdi, a young boy whose body washed ashore
on the beach, were difficult to ignore.27 Merkel made the politically brave decision not to close
Germany’s borders to asylum seekers, appealing to a growing Willkommenskultur. Merkel
defended her decision by arguing that Germany had a unique obligation to help refugees. Part of
this was due to “Germany’s historical responsibility to protect political refugees after the
experience of the Nazi dictatorship.”28 In this way, she appealed strongly to the ideas of the
Vergangenheitsbewältigung. In her mind and in the minds of many Germans, this was a chance
to prove that Germany could put racism and nationalism behind. On a personal level, Merkel
also felt empathy for refugees because of the history of East Germans who had grown up behind
the Iron Curtain and were unable to migrate for a better life.
Merkel’s decision received strong reactions, both positive and negative. For a short time,
the response was relatively positive due to the effect of Willkommenskultur that Merkel and
immigration activists had created. Ulrike Hamann and Serhat Karakayali document how the
number of people volunteering for refugee-aid organizations in Germany had been steadily
increasing prior to the summer of 2015. They write that “every major political party, trade union,
company, all kinds of associations and the media joined in the welcoming campaign,” including
the populist, right-leaning tabloid ‘BILD.’29 However, the attitude towards refugees changed
drastically at the beginning of 2016 following extensive coverage of attacks at a New Year’s Eve
celebration in Cologne. A group of men, some asylum seekers and others German citizens, were
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accused of sexual assault and rape of numerous women at the celebration. Stereotypes
surrounding Muslim refugees and immigrants suddenly abounded in right-wing circles. Even in
more centrist publications, Muslims and refugees were suddenly viewed with higher levels of
suspicion. This resulted in a sharp uptick in nationalist terrorism: in 2016, there were 595 attacks
on asylum seekers, 123 arson attacks on accommodation for asylum seekers, and 3,056 further
acts of violence perpetrated by right-wing extremists. These attacks occurred disproportionately
in the East: 43 percent of right-wing terror attacks were committed there, despite the East
comprising only 20 percent of the population of Germany.30 Bock and Macdonald write that
“especially in the East, rejection, often hatred, of foreigners was expressed in brutal attacks,” as
well as through electoral support for the AfD. “Discontent and anger were also directed at the
political establishment and Chancellor Merkel in particular.”31
Despite the calls for Willkommenskultur, anti-refugee and anti-Islam sentiment (the
German radical right often conflates the two) was already high in the leadup to the ‘crisis.’ A few
years prior, Thilo Sarrazin’s book Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany is Doing Away with
Itself) brought the topic of Islam in Germany into the national debate.32 Sarrazin argued that
Muslims in Germany are unwilling and incapable of integrating into German society and that
Muslims lack intelligence. The book proved that “seventy years after the Holocaust, it is possible
to express ideas of racial superiority openly, discriminate against minorities, and to deny them
respect as human beings.”33
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The year of 2014 was the peak of anti-refugee protests organized by the AfD and a
closely related far-right organization known as PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the
Islamification of the Occident.)34 In the winter of 2014, PEGIDA mobilized up to 25,000
supporters in Dresden to protest refugee acceptance. These demonstrations were known merely
as ‘Spaziergänge,’ which translates roughly to ‘walks’ or ‘strolls.’ They were engineered to
resemble the atmosphere of 1989, before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Then, ‘Monday
demonstrations’ were a series of protests in Leipzig which kickstarted the fall of the GDR. In
2014, ‘Monday demonstrations’ referred to the anti-immigrant, far-right PEGIDA protests in
Dresden.
The most emblematic slogan of German reunification, “Wir sind das Volk!” (We are the
people) made a resurgence in these protests as well. The return of this slogan shows the type of
people who far-right activists were targeting. Wir sind das Volk carries much more significance
in the East than in the West because of the memory of the pro-democracy demonstrations in
1989. Easterners specifically attribute the phrase to democracy, the fall of authoritarianism, and
national pride. However, the use of the phrase has changed significantly since then. Former
President of the Bundestag Wolfgang Thierse, who grew up in the GDR, described the new
rhetoric as a reversal of the original meaning. It had changed to represent nationalism and
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xenophobia, “the opposite of 1989.”35 Richard Schröder, a theologian and civil rights activist,
notes that this change is represented in the emphasis in the phrase. In 1989, as demonstrators
called for democratic representation, the emphasis was clearly on ‘das Volk’—the people who
the state is supposed to represent. Under PEGIDA and the AfD, the emphasis shifted to ‘Wir’—
We are the people, but refugees and Muslims are not the people. Despite this shift, positive
associations with the phrase make it an effective tool for nationalist extremists, even its new
meaning represents the antithesis of the 1989 objectives.36

Immigration Politics of the AfD
Even as early as 2014, the AfD had connections to the PEGIDA demonstrations.
Prominent AfD politicians, such as Björn Höcke, praised PEGIDA.37 The 2014 manifesto of the
AfD reflects this anti-immigration sentiment.38 Immigration and asylum politics took a central
place in their 2014 manifesto in a section titled “For a Capably-Competitive and Social EU” (Für
eine wettbewerbsfähige und soziale EU). Here, they begin with positive-sounding language,
emphasizing a “humane” (menschenwürdig) immigration and asylum policy, promoting an
“open and foreigner-friendly Germany” (ein offenes und ausländerfreundliches Deutschland).
They write that Germany’s demographic development requires qualified immigration. The
welfare system is also a major theme of their immigration section: “immigration into German
social welfare” is portrayed as a significant threat to German society, and they argue for the need
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to defend the social welfare system from abuse by immigrants. The AfD used considerably less
inflammatory rhetoric and was also much less extreme on these issues than they would become
in the following years. However, behind the moderate-sounding language, these policies would
have severe consequences for many people in Germany. Immigrants who do not have the means
to support themselves through earned income, assets, and social benefits, would have to “return
to their homeland” (Heimat), which would essentially amount to deportations.
By the 2017 election, immigration and Islam were the unquestionably the main issues of
the AfD. In comparison with their previous election manifestos, the 2017 manifesto places a
significantly stronger emphasis on the topic of immigration and asylum.39 The chapter is called
“Asylum needs borders: Immigration and Asylum” (Asyl braucht Grenzen: Zuwanderung und
Asyl) and begins with the claim that African and Arab populations are ‘exploding’ due to a much
higher birthrate than that in Europe or in Germany.40 The authors disdainfully note that
international aid has contributed to a decrease in the global child mortality rate. The implication
here is that nonwhite Africans and Arabs are primitive and unable to take care of themselves. In
addition, they provide statistics showing that a large portion of Africans, especially young men,
are ‘willing to emigrate’ (auswanderungswillig).41 They estimate this number to be
approximately 350 million. The term ‘auswanderungswillig’ hides the reasons why people flee
their homeland. The vast majority of asylum seekers in Germany or in the rest of the EU have
fled not because they were ‘willing’ to, but because conditions at home made it physically unsafe
for them to live there.
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However, the biggest shift in policy and rhetoric for the AfD between 2014 and 2017 was
not on immigration, but on Islam. For the AfD, these issues became interconnected due to their
assumption that refugees are Muslim. This is shown in the following chapter of the manifesto is
titled “Islam in Conflict with the Free Democratic Basic Order” (Der Islam im Konflikt mit der
freiheitlich-demokratischen Grundordnung).42 It begins with the blunt statement that “Islam does
not belong in Germany,” a statement which has been repeated numerous times in the past few
years at far-right protests. Specifically, the AfD say they want to prevent “Islamic parallel
societies” from expanding in Germany, in which Islamic courts practice Sharia and undermine
the German state. They argue this on the basis of protecting basic freedoms, ironically including
freedom of religion and freedom of thought (Glaubens-, Gewissens-, und Bekenntnisfreiheit).
Clearly, they do not include the practice of Islam in their understanding of the freedom of
religion. In defense of this obvious contradiction, they argue that all they are doing is “a rational
critique of religion,” and calling it Islamophobia or racism is a ‘defamation’ thereof.43
Even though the issue of migration did not receive as much attention from mainstream
media outlets in the leadup to the 2021 election, this did not mean that it ceased to be an
important issue for the AfD. Like many populist movements, the AfD has developed a strong
social media presence on websites such as Facebook and Twitter. It has been especially
successful on Facebook, where the official page of the AfD has over 542,000 followers.44 In
comparison, the official page of the CDU has around 228,000, less than half as many, while the
SPD has a mere 86,000 followers.45 Both the CDU and SPD received significantly more votes
than the AfD in the 2021 election, but the AfD has clearly been more successful at reaching
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voters through Facebook. In many ways, the rhetoric that AfD politicians use on social media is
more important than what they write in the election manifesto. Far more people are likely to read
and share a post on social media than will read the official manifesto because social media is
simply more accessible.
Anti-immigration sentiment be clearly seen on the social media pages of AfD politicians,
and it is still a key issue that they are using to attract their voters. One twitter post on November
10, 2021, by Gerrit Huy, a speaker for the AfD in the Bundestag, reads “BKA statistic confirms:
clear connection between immigration and crime!” The post calls for the deportation of
‘criminals’ (Straftäter) and ‘potential threats’ (Gefährder), “even to Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Syria.”46 Deporting refugees to war zones is against international law. Another post on July 3,
2021, from Dr. Malte Kaufmann reads, “Drugs, break-ins, clan-swamp (Clan-Sumpf)? We do not
want immigration like this! The AfD has long demanded a fundamental change in migration
policy. Out with unconditional ‘Willkommenskultur’. Our land—our laws, norms, and values!”47
Both of these posts appeal to the prejudice that immigrants—specifically those from Middle
Eastern countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria—are much more likely to commit crime
than white Germans, and that this is an inherent aspect of their identity. However, what Huy and
others fail to mention is that many ‘crimes’ committed by immigrants and documented by the
BKA (Federal Office of Criminality) are often not crimes that would apply to native-born
Germans, such as illegally crossing the border or forgetting their pass.

46

Gerrit Huy, „#BKA - Statistik belegt,“ Twitter post, Nov. 10, 2021,
https://twitter.com/GerritHuy/status/1458320364853936128.
47
Malte Kaufmann, „Drogen, Einbrüche, Clan-Sumpf?“ Twitter post, Jul. 3, 2021,
https://twitter.com/MalteKaufmann/status/1411243554513502208.

26

AfD’s Stance on COVID-19
In the last few years, the pandemic has largely overshadowed migration in the news and
in public discourse. Like many countries, Germany has been hit hard by the pandemic.
According to the WHO, Germany has recorded approximately 24.7 million cases and 135,000
deaths of COVID-19 as of April 2022.48 However, this shift in focus has not taken away from the
AfD’s appeal. Even though immigration was not a major topic in the media during the leadup to
the 2021 election, the AfD did not suffer significant losses. To the contrary, the pandemic seems
to have provided the AfD with a completely new realm of anti-establishment politics to explore.
Throughout the pandemic, national and state governments have imposed strict restrictions
in an effort to limit the spread of COVID-19 and save lives. However, many people who have
come to disagree with pandemic policies, such as vaccine mandates, are not necessarily rightleaning on other issues, and may feel attracted to the AfD’s stances against further restrictions.
One group which became known for anti-lockdown ideas is the Querdenker movement. They
have been responsible for spreading false conspiracy theories about COVID vaccines, which a
significant portion of Germans have come to believe. The movement was marked for
surveillance by Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) April 28, 2021.
Interestingly, the BfV created a new category for the Querdenker. According to the intelligence
agency, “the movement does not fall into pre-existing categories of concern—such as far-right,
far-left, or Islamist—but a new category,” which they call “delegitimization of the state where
relevant to constitutional protection.” The movement had shown that “their agenda goes beyond
mere mobilization to protest against the state’s coronavirus protection measures.”49 The
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Querdenker have ties to far-right separatist organizations such as the Reichsbürger and
Selbstverwalter groups, which are using COVID protests to gain support.50
German protests against pandemic restrictions have drawn international media attention.
Most of these protests are organized by far-right groups with ties to the AfD. In Brandenburg,
many protests are organized by “Zukunft Heimat” (Future Homeland). Founded in 2015 during
the ‘refugee crisis,’ the group spreads nationalist and anti-refugee ideas. One of its co-founders,
Christoph Berndt, is the parliamentary leader of the AfD in Brandenburg. Berndt has made a
long list of controversial statements about the pandemic, questioning “whether anyone has died
of COVID,” questioning the existence of the virus, and refusing to wear a mask “because it is a
‘symbol of suppression.’”51 Like the protests organized by PEGIDA in 2014, these protests take
advantage of the nostalgia and pride of the protestors in 1989. ‘Wir sind das Volk’ has once again
made a resurgence, this time serving the argument that pandemic restrictions are unpopular. It is
a populist message which criticizes elite policymakers and pandemic experts for implementing
unpopular, arbitrary policies, which the AfD and its supporters criticize as authoritarian.
Additionally, ‘no dictatorship!’ is one of the slogans which can be heard at these rallies and
could easily be perceived as a slight reference to the East German memory of authoritarianism
under the SED.
As one would expect, the pandemic was a major issue in the AfD’s 2021 manifesto
leading up to the election. In a section titled “Health Policy” (Gesundheitspolitik), the manifesto
calls for an end to ‘disproportionate’ COVID measures, which they criticize as limiting basic
rights through arbitrary and incomprehensible rules. They oppose mask mandates, especially in

50

“Germany Puts Anti-Lockdown Querdenker Group under Observation.”
Kate Connolly, “‘Peace, Freedom, No Dictatorship!’: Germans Protest against Covid Restrictions,” The Guardian,
January 25, 2022, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/25/peace-freedom-nodictatorship-germans-protest-against-covid-restrictions.

51

28
schools and day-care centers, as well as lockdowns. They also oppose vaccine mandates, whether
they are directly imposed by the government or imposed by employers or stores, which they
believe should not be able to reject people based on vaccination status. The official manifesto
does not express explicit anti-vaccine conspiracy theories. The AfD places an emphasis on
voluntary vaccination, defending their position on the basis of “bodily integrity” (körperliche
Unversehrtheit).52 However, this is all they need to appeal to vaccine skeptics across the country,
as the AfD remains the party most opposed to all pandemic restrictions by far.
One might expect these issues to fall under a section about health policy. However, the
AfD goes on to suggest an investigation into the COVID policies implemented by the
government. The manifesto proposes investigating a “lacking scientific discourse” in policymaking decisions, limitations on constitutional rights, and the physical and psychological effects
of pandemic restrictions. In addition, the party speculates about pandemic-related corruption
through the personal enrichment of government representatives and officials during the
pandemic.53 This conspiratorial thinking appeals to those who already distrust the government.
By calling for an investigation, they give legitimacy to the idea that pandemic restrictions are not
actually designed for the best interests of Germany, which is a belief that could still be held even
while disagreeing with individual restrictions or mandates. For those who distrust the
government, which includes most AfD supporters, the fact that this corruption has not been
proven by an investigation—which will most likely never happen, as the AfD is not part of the
governing coalition—will not matter.
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Like the issue of immigration, the AfD’s stance on the pandemic is also clearly visible on
social media. On its main Facebook page, the party posted on April 29, 2022 arguing against the
mandatory vaccination for health care workers.54 The AfD opposes the vaccine mandate for
everyone of course, but this post is especially interesting because they are using the anti-vaccine
movement to appear to care for health care workers. They write, “We from the AfD stand by
health care workers—not only with words, but also with actions.” They write that health care
workers have been going to work discouraged for a long time and are now facing the unfair
choice whether to lose their jobs or give up their ‘bodily integrity’ (körperliche Unversehrtheit).
The AfD’s stance on pandemic issues shows their most recent attempt to appeal to antiestablishment sentiments in German society. Like the issue of refugee acceptance, which
radicalized the AfD and allowed them to become relevant on the national stage, Germans who
are already predisposed to distrust the government are more likely to be convinced that pandemic
restrictions are unnecessary and that the AfD is looking out for their interests. The difference
between pandemic issues and immigration may be that resistance to pandemic restrictions are not
as inherently nationalistic, whereas anti-immigration politics are often inextricably tied with
racism and nationalism. Then again, the pandemic is also temporary. Even if the coronavirus
never disappears, restrictions will at some point, and so will the politics of opposing them. It is
unclear how the pandemic will affect the AfD’s future electoral chances, but it is certainly
possible that the Querdenker protests and internet rabbit holes will introduce more people to the
radical right and the AfD, even after the restrictions themselves are gone.
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Chapter 2: What Attracts AfD Voters?
At the end of the Cold War, there was a consensus in the West that liberal democracy had
triumphed over communism. Some Western elites were so optimistic that they believed the end
of the Cold War to mark the ‘end of history.’55 Liberal democracy would spread everywhere
unchallenged and eventually would lead to global prosperity, leaving no reason for anyone to
oppose the system. However, the rise of populist radical right parties is one way in which this
rosy view of the world is being proven false. Liberal democracies are not necessarily stable or
equitable societies and democratic backsliding is possible.
The most widely accepted definition of populist radical right parties comes from Cas
Mudde.56 According to Mudde, the three most important features of radical right parties are
nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. Nativism combines nationalism and xenophobia, and
the central idea of it is that non-native elements of society, such as immigrants, threaten the
stability of the nation. Radical right parties also usually contain authoritarian tendencies,
meaning that they are unusually aggressive to their opponents and question democratic norms
and institutions. Many radical right parties also contain elements of populism, which Mudde
interprets as an ideology that sees the elites of society as malevolent and selfish actors in conflict
with the poor or working class.
Much of the traditional explanation for the success of right-wing populism hinges on
economic factors. For example, Inglehart and Norris describe how these dynamics are playing
out in populist-authoritarian movements around the world. According to them, the story begins
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with the onset of relative existential security in Western democracies after World War II. This
made people in these societies more accepting and tolerant of new, postmaterialist ideas, which
were “less conformist, more open to new ideas, less authoritarian, and more tolerant of
outgroups.”57 This process is known as the Silent Revolution thesis.
However, Inglehart and Norris also argue that ideas of cultural tolerance are dependent on
continually high levels of economic and physical security. Their theory is cyclical in nature. It
begins with stable economic conditions in liberal democracies, which led to the emergence of
new cultural issues. In general, according to them, societies became more tolerant, especially on
issues such as immigration and LGBTQ rights, for example. This may have angered older,
traditionally conservative groups, but not in large enough numbers for these groups to stop this
progression. However, Inglehart and Norris argue that this focus on cultural issues coincided
with economic issues being ignored. Left wing parties had traditionally been oriented towards
the working class and had pushed for policies of wealth redistribution in the twentieth century,
but began to increasingly give attention to cultural issues at the expense of redistribution. Many
liberal democracies have experienced unprecedented levels of economic inequality despite
increasing GDP, which has contributed to a populist backlash against liberalism. Especially
among members of dominant racial or ethnic groups of a certain society, the populist anti-elite
sentiment easily became weaponized by nationalism and the radical right.
However, the explanation for the rise of the AfD in Germany is much more complex. Many
scholars have observed that traditional measures of socioeconomic status, such as income and
employment, have little to no correlation on the likelihood that an individual will vote for the
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AfD.58 This fact appears to contradict traditional theories for the appeal of populism, such as the
one proposed by Inglehart and Norris. To understand the appeal of populism and the radical right
in Eastern Germany, we should discuss the history of how this issue has been approached in
academia.

Support for the AfD between 2013 and 2015
When the AfD emerged with unexpectedly strong results in 2013, many people attempted to
explain its appeal. Although it had a populist message, it was not yet clear that the AfD would
embrace right-wing extremism as it has. Many scholars noted that Germany had finally joined
the group of countries with a significant euro-skeptic party, sometimes seeming surprised that it
had taken so long. For example, Kai Arzheimer wrote “The AfD: Finally a Successful
Eurosceptic Party for Germany?”59 Arzheimer described the AfD as a ‘soft euro-skeptic’ party,
and concluded that it did not belong to the group of radical right parties in Europe at that time.
He pointed to political disaffection and anti-immigrant attitudes as the most important factors
motivating AfD voters. In a very similar vein, Berbuir, Lewandowsky, and Siri wrote “The AfD
and its Sympathisers: Finally a Right-Wing Populist Movement in Germany?”60 They aimed to
study the ideological profile of AfD sympathizers. They found that most AfD sympathizers had
voted for the CDU/CSU in the previous election. Interestingly, most also placed themselves in
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the political center. In its early days, the AfD tried to present itself as a ‘catch-all-protest party’
that was open to anyone who felt dissatisfied with the political establishment, regardless of
ideology. However, the authors note that this goal was undermined by some of the strongest
positions of the AfD at that time, such as a strong aversion to multiculturalism and the
“condemnation of non-heteronormative lifestyles such as same-sex unions or ‘political
correctness’.”61 This pointed to an element of radicalism beyond traditional conservatism within
the party, which is often employed by the Christian right and nationalist groups. Berbuir,
Lewandowsky, and Siri concluded that at that time, the AfD was a “projection screen for
different concerns and purposes” and a “functional equivalent for right-wing parties in a country
where open right-wing extremism and right-wing populism is tabooed.”62
Although the AfD before 2015 may not have been as radical as other right-wing populist
parties in Europe, as the only party to challenge Germany’s long-held consensus on supporting
the European Union and the Euro, it was already somewhat radical by German standards. So,
who voted for them in this early stage and why? Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck’s analysis of a survey
conducted by the German Longitudinal Election Study provides many helpful insights.63 He
shows who AfD voters in 2013 voted for in 2009. The AfD drew votes from all parties, but they
drew disproportionately from voters who chose a non-mainstream party, non-voters, and those
who were not eligible to vote in 2009. They also drew many votes from the FDP, which had a
strong performance in 2009, but, like the AfD, failed to surpass the five percent threshold in
2013.
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Schmitt-Beck also provides a statistical analysis of the attitudes of AfD voters in 2013 on
the economy and on the Euro-crisis. He found that there was an extremely strong correlation
between voting for the AfD and being pessimistic about the prospects of the economy. While
only 22 percent of those surveyed shared this view, many of them were AfD voters.
Interestingly, AfD voters were not any more likely to feel personally threatened by the economy
than voters of any other party. This suggests that at this early stage, economic issues were the
driving force of the AfD, but also that AfD voters were not voting out of personal desperation.
Another issue which aligned with support for the AfD was the Euro-crisis. AfD voters were
likely to name the Euro-crisis as the most important political problem for Germany and were also
likely to express fear of its effects. Additionally, AfD voters strongly opposed the bailout of
Euro-crisis countries, which is no surprise since the party was founded primarily in opposition to
that policy.64 Although economic issues were probably the most important for the majority of
AfD voters in 2013, cultural issues also played a role. The most notable correlation among
cultural issues was the attitude of AfD voters on the integration of immigrants, with AfD voters
being extremely likely to agree with the statement that “immigrants should integrate themselves”
into society. However, AfD voters as a whole were not more likely to name immigration as the
most important issue facing Germany, probably in part because many of them considered that to
be the Euro-crisis.65

64
65

Schmitt-Beck.
Schmitt-Beck.

35

Radicalization
As established in Chapter 1, Germany’s acceptance of refugees in the summer of 2015
was the most important issue for the radicalization of the AfD. This radicalization resulted in
significant changes in party leadership. Within the AfD, there were vigorous debates about the
future of the party. Part of this also had to do with the fact that the party was still relatively new
and unestablished. However, the nature of the party as an ‘alternative’ party that was supposed to
welcome all ideologies may have also contributed to the extent of the inner instability that it
experienced. After the 2014 European parliamentary elections, the socially conservative wing of
the party increasingly pushed for the AfD to give more attention to cultural issues. They did not
wish to be perceived as a single-issue party and believed that they could earn more votes by
representing hardline conservative positions on many cultural issues. This included immigration
but was not limited to it. As well as representing skepticism towards multiculturalism, Sara
Ceyhan notes that the party also represented a conservative vision of ‘family politics.’66 The
founder of the AfD, Bernd Lucke, disapproved of the direction that the party was heading and
attempted to stop it with the ‘Weckruf 2015’ (wake-up call) initiative in May, 2015. Lucke and
other members of this initiative saw the AfD as threatened by representatives of the ‘new right.’
However, when Lucke was up for reelection as chair of the party, he lost. He was replaced by
Frauke Petry, representing a huge victory for the nationalist wing of the AfD. Lucke then
withdrew from the party, not wanting to associate himself with it anymore. Petry proceeded to
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strongly oppose Merkel’s open-door policy toward Syrian refugees and open up the party to
blatantly xenophobic rhetoric.67
The conservative wing’s strategy to focus on cultural issues worked: in the 2017 federal
election, the AfD’s voter base expanded tremendously, receiving more than three times as many
votes as they did in 2013. Wurthmann et al. calls the AfD the ‘one winner’ of the election, noting
that the 2017 election was the biggest loss ever for the CDU/CSU and SPD.68 Many studies have
found strong evidence that the ideology of AfD voters shifted along with the party’s policy
positions. Immigration was now listed as the number one issue by AfD voters, whereas in 2013,
the most important issue for AfD voters had been the Euro-crisis. Hansen and Olsen argue that
for those voters, the AfD served as a single-issue party for anti-immigrant sentiment.69
Interestingly, Arzheimer and Berning note that although the AfD galvanized support from antiimmigration politics, their success did not coincide with an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment
on a national level.70 Additionally, AfD voters now self-identified further to the right on the
political spectrum than voters of any other party. After the 2017 election, the AfD could be
considered a radical right populist party, in line with other populist right parties in Western
Europe.
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Culture or Economics? The AfD as a Protest Party
Many studies have concluded that the AfD functions as a protest party as well as a singleissue anti-immigrant party. One of the opinions commonly shared by AfD voters in 2017 was a
disapproval of German democracy, and many of them were dissatisfied in part because of the
government’s handling of immigration. Notably, high levels of dissatisfaction with the
government was shared by voters of the Left Party, although for different reasons. Proportional
to the size of the Left, the AfD took more votes from the Left than from any other party. The Left
is often seen as a traditional protest party in eastern Germany. Historically, it represents the old
Socialist Unity Party (SED) of East Germany and West German leftists who deserted the SPD
when it shifted right in the 2000s. However, many of its voters in the East tended to vote for it
less out of an ideological affiliation with the party and more because of the party’s antiestablishment message. In 2017, it appears that many protest voters from the Left Party who
were dissatisfied with the government chose to express that dissatisfaction with a vote for the
AfD.71 Hansen and Olsen find that over half of AfD voters are motivated “not out of conviction
for the AfD itself but rather out of frustration with all the other parties,” which supports the idea
that the AfD functions as a protest party to a large extent.72
The ideological profile of AfD voters is somewhat easier to establish than their
demographic and socioeconomic profile. Some things were clear: AfD voters were
overwhelmingly male and were more likely to live in the East than voters of the other parties in
the Bundestag. AfD voters also tended to be younger or middle-aged. Arzheimer and Berning
find that voters above the age of 60 were significantly less likely to vote AfD, “presumably
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because they identify with one of the established parties.”73 The most likely age group to vote
AfD was between 30-39 years, although the authors also note that “the effect is small” and that
“the differences between this and the two next age groups are themselves not statistically
significant.”74
Socioeconomically, however, AfD voters do not have a particularly specific profile in
comparison to voters of other parties. Hansen and Olsen suggest that this may be partly due to
the fact that the AfD has drawn voters from all of the other parties.75 Regardless, it appears that
AfD voters are not especially disadvantaged in terms of income, unemployment, or education
level. This is somewhat surprising and does not align with the typical view of right-wing
populism as appealing to economically disadvantaged segments of society.76 This fact led Holger
Lengfeld to conclude that socioeconomic status is simply an unimportant factor in explaining the
motivation to vote for the AfD, and that AfD voters should not be thought of as ‘losers of
modernization (Modernisierungsverlierer).77 According to Lengfeld, none of the indicators of
socioeconomic status provide evidence for the ‘losers of modernization theory’
(Modernisierungsverliererthese). Rather, the ‘nationalism theory’ (Nationalismusthese),
according to which people vote for the AfD simply because they prefer cultural homogeneity and
feel attracted to calls for political and economic autonomy, is much more accurate in explaining
support for the AfD. Even those who see themselves as ‘losers of societal development’ are not
especially likely to vote for the AfD. Lengfeld also points out that the AfD’s economic policies
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do not even appear to appeal to poorer classes of society. In terms of economic policy, it has
maintained its neoliberal stances on market competition and government spending, even if it
does not speak about them much.
However, not everyone is ready to conclude that socioeconomic status plays no role in
the decision to vote for the AfD. Tutić and von Hermanni argue that the decision to discount
socioeconomic status is based on a misevaluation of economic factors.78 For example, Inglehart
and Norris omit income level as a variable, and Lengfeld does not adjust for the size of the
household when working with income variables. According to Tutić and von Hermanni, support
for the AfD is socially layered and heavily influenced by lower education levels, lower income,
unemployment, or working-class employment. However, they also note that their findings do not
by any means reject the validity of the cultural backlash hypothesis. According to them, rightwing positions opposing immigration, refugees, and feminism obviously influence right-wing
voters to vote for the AfD, because the AfD explicitly shares these opinions in their platform and
rhetoric. Rather, their results show a connection between the right-wing ideology that motivates
someone to vote for the AfD and socioeconomic status.
Clearly, the relationship between economics and support for the AfD is complicated.
Jennifer Yoder notes that, in the case of the AfD, prior experiences with economic hardship may
play a more significant role than present socioeconomic status. She writes that “for many,
experiences with unemployment and economic uncertainty in the 1990s were wholly unfamiliar
and were felt as individual and collective existential crises.”79 These experiences were not
limited to those who lived through the 1990s, but also “conditioned the way the next generation
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or two perceived their individual status and the well-being of their families and communities.”
She also finds a relationship between the fear that one’s socioeconomic status is at risk in the
future and support for the AfD.80
On the one hand, it is not helpful to say that right-wing ideology is the only factor that
motivates support for the AfD, since this explanation does not address the source of that rightwing ideology in the first place. On the other hand, it is also difficult to say that economics are
the main driver of the AfD without a direct correlation with current socioeconomic status. Even
though Tutić and von Hermanni show that a higher income makes someone less likely to vote for
the AfD, it is not the case that AfD voters represent the poorest segment of the population. These
findings have led me to propose a more historical focus on the motivations of AfD voters. In the
next two chapters, I look at two historical legacies that could help explain the AfD’s appeal in
the East. First, the I analyze the legacy of the GDR and how that affects attitudes on cultural
issues, such as memory, race, and democracy. Then, I move to the legacy of reunification and
how the policies surrounding this momentous historical event affect socioeconomic status and
Easterners’ attitudes towards the federal government.
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Chapter 3: The Legacy of the GDR and the Power of Memory
In the fictional film ‘Good Bye, Lenin!’ the main character, Alex, takes care of his
mother, who fell into a coma just before the fall of the Berlin Wall.81 The doctors tell him that
his mother should not be exposed to any stimulating or surprising experience, which could
trigger another heart attack. His mother loves the GDR, so he decides to hide the fall of the wall
from her. Of course, this becomes more difficult as the East becomes more and more
westernized, and the methods he resorts to in order to keep the secret become more and more
extravagant. The film is funny, but also sad and nostalgic.
‘Good Bye, Lenin!’ represents a concept known in German as Ostalgie, a term which
combines the words for ‘East’ and ‘nostalgia.’ Ostalgie refers to the positive memories
Easterners have of the GDR. When looking to the past, it is a common psychological
phenomenon to elevate good memories over bad ones. We tend to look back on ‘the good old
days’ with fondness, and this is what is captured by Ostalgie. ‘Good Bye, Lenin!’ was released
in 2003 and was one of the most successful German films, both in the East and in the West. In
the first few months after its release, nearly 6 million Germans went to see it in movie theaters,
and it won the 2003 German Film Prize. Interestingly, the director of the film, Wolfgang Becker,
is West German, but the film’s popularity and success shows the prevalence and importance of
Ostalgie in German society. The notion of positive associations with the GDR might come as a
surprise to Western audiences, since we tend to think of East Germany as an oppressive,
authoritarian state whose citizens were trying to escape its borders. However, Becker notes that
his research for this film made him understand that “the typical East German life story doesn’t
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exist, not this one pattern. Some found their country a prison, you could still feel how strong the
hate was. Others simply lived in there. I wanted to get a feeling for the country.”82
What does the success of ‘Good Bye, Lenin’ have to do with support for the AfD in the
East? The key factor is that the experience of the GDR, positive or negative, is something that
causes those living in the East to feel misunderstood by the rest of the country. Sometimes, the
experience was simply different and was perceived by East German citizens neither positively
nor negatively. Nostalgia for the GDR has been amplified by socioeconomic disparities between
the East and the West and by a rejection of the cosmopolitanism and globalization that came with
reunification.83 Political groups like the AfD take advantage of this feeling to gain more support.
This legacy has led to skepticism of German institutions and politics, which the AfD exploits
through ambiguous relationships with even more radical neo-Nazis and neo-Nazi ideas, as well
as by standing against immigration and the political establishment. In this chapter, I focus on
three aspects of the GDR’s legacy: the state of the radical right in East Germany; the differences
in memory culture between the East and West, which played a significant role in the
development of the East German radical right; and the police state of the GDR.

The Radical Right in the GDR
The success of the radical right in the East is nothing new. During the 1980s, the radical
right began to take advantage of the weakening East German state. Neo-Nazi organizations
began to emerge within groups of skinheads, rock fans, and rowdy football fans. An important
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turning point in the politicization and radicalization of these groups occurred in October 1987 at
a rock concert in East Berlin’s Zion church, which was attacked by 25-30 skinheads. In the
aftermath of the attack, the perpetrators “instantly became the focus of intense public attention in
both Germanys,” and they were prosecuted and severely punished.84 This attack was perpetrated
by a group called the Lichtenberg Front, which was founded in 1986. Many of its members had
come from a fan club of the East German football team ‘Berliner Fußballclub Dynamo,’ which
reflects a connection between football and far-right activism. The Lichtenberg Front changed
their name in 1988 to ‘The January 30 Movement’, “evoking the Nazi takeover of power in
1933.”85 That year, they were responsible for vandalizing a Jewish cemetery at Schönhauser
Allee.
In the final years of the GDR, groups such as the January 30 Movement began to show
themselves much more openly and benefited from the patriotic, pro-democracy atmosphere of
reunification. The radical right protested alongside pro-democracy demonstrators, calling for a
‘united German fatherland.’ The weeks following the fall of the Berlin Wall saw extremely high
levels of neo-Nazi violence and terrorist attacks, usually targeting immigrants and former GDR
contract workers. The first prominent case of this occurred in 1991 in the town of Hoyerswerda
in Saxony.86 Neo-Nazi skinheads rioted and attacked Vietnamese market stall owners, who had
been employed under the GDR as contract workers. They also used petrol bombs to attack two
housing estates for asylum-seekers. The riots lasted from September 17 to September 23 and
triggered anti-immigrant violence in at least 20 other towns across Germany. Perpetrators of the
violence proceeded to declare the town of Hoyerswerda ‘ausländerfrei’—free of foreigners. The
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following year, another outbreak of violence became prominent in the town of RostockLichtenhagen. Neo-Nazis attacked residents of a hostel for asylum seekers with Molotov
cocktails. Onlookers joined in and the crowd grew to a total of 3,000. They chanted the slogan
‘Germany to the Germans, foreigners out!’87 All in all, anti-immigrant violence increased
dramatically in the early 1990s. In 1990, there were approximately 300 attacks per month in all
of Germany. In October 1991, there were 961 and in September 1992 there were 1,100. The
violence reached a peak at 1,400 attacks in June 1993.
Many victims of the attacks in East Germany were so-called ‘guest workers’
(Gastarbeiter). Both East and West Germany made treaties with other countries with the idea
that their economies could benefit from foreign labor, while the guest workers themselves could
earn more money from working in Germany than they would in their home country. They could
send money home to their families and most likely return home with some savings after the end
of their contract. However, there were some important differences between the guest worker
programs in the West and in the East. In the West, most guest workers came from countries in
the Mediterranean basin, most notably Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Italy.88 In contrast, guest
workers in the East often came from socialist ‘sister countries’ outside of Europe, such as
Vietnam and Mozambique. They usually lived in small, isolated communities with very low
levels of integration.89
Many West Germans tended to think of these attacks in the new Bundesländer as
remnants of an ‘other Germany’ which was still plagued by fascist tendencies. Although it came
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to be seen as an Eastern problem, the violence was by no means confined to the East. According
to Esther Adaire, “outbreaks of violence against foreigners were occurring in the West and the
East but the magnitude of those in Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lichtenhagen caused it to be seen
as an Eastern phenomenon.”90 Additionally, the fact that Western neo-Nazis moved to the East
during the reunification process shows that it may not be accurate to think of the radical right as
a purely Eastern phenomenon. However, despite Western elements of the radical right, radical
right ideas certainly caught on in the new Bundesländer and arguably became more prevalent
than they ever had been in the Federal Republic. This prevalence of radical right ideas also
extends to attitudes toward national pride and the role of democracy, which are not harmful by
themselves but may contribute to sympathy for the radical right in some contexts.

Ghosts of the Past
Many explanations for the resurgence of the radical right had to do with memory culture
and memory politics. Many people in the West saw their country as already having effectively
combatted the remnants of National Socialism with the Vergangenheitsbewältigung. In the West,
the Holocaust had been portrayed as the “central tragedy of the Nazi era,” and racism and
antisemitism had been blamed as the primary causes of the rise of Nazism.91 Racism and
antisemitism came to be seen by many to be incompatible with democracy, as did German
national pride. The idea of collective guilt (kollektive Schuld) became very widespread, which
meant that West Germans often felt personally responsible for the Holocaust in some way, even
if they had not personally participated in the atrocities. Even future generations who had not even
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been born until after World War II felt as if they were obliged to atone for the crimes of their
parents’ generation, which sometimes led to difficult intergenerational conflicts within
families.92 Many West Germans were reluctant to even identify with the German nationality.
Instead, many preferred to emphasize a European identity or a ‘constitutional patriotism’ based
on pride of the values expressed in the new constitution (Grundgesetz) rather than national
identity. On the governmental level, this was one reason that the Federal Republic has always
supported further European integration. Importantly, German suffering during World War II was
a controversial topic in the West. Cities that were bombed in the air raids, such as Hamburg,
Pforzheim, and Kassel held annual commemorations but often avoided “thorny questions of
agency and causality.”93
Memory culture in the GDR stood, in many ways, in complete opposition to that in the
West. Influenced by the Soviet Union, the SED attempted to implement a strict interpretation of
the events of World War II and German history. Their narrative was based in Marxist thought,
which argues that the workers’ revolution towards communism was inevitable, and the creation
of the GDR was part of this narrative. While portraying themselves as building a socialist utopia,
they simultaneously attributed negative aspects of German society to the West. The Federal
Republic came to represent capitalism, imperialism, and militarism, which were the most
important contributing factors to the rise of National Socialism according to the SED.94 This
narrative was important to help the SED achieve its most important goal: proving that East
German citizens respected its legitimacy.
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World War II was the defining event of recent history in the late 1940s and 1950s, so
naturally the framing of the events of the war was very important to the SED. Unlike in the West,
where the idea of collective guilt meant that the Holocaust was considered the central crime for
which all Germans were guilty, the GDR focused much less on the Holocaust itself. Its version
of history focused primarily on capitalism and greed as the causes. According to the GDR,
National Socialism was created to represent capitalist interests, primarily to create profit for
German businesses. Anti-Semitism existed, but rather than being seen as an endemic problem in
German and European society, the SED believed that it was manufactured by capitalists as “a
means of distracting the masses” while the Nazis fought against working class interests by
dismantling trade unions and left-wing political parties.95 The Holocaust played a relatively
small role in this history, and when it was discussed, the suffering of Jews and racial minorities
was overshadowed by the political persecution of communists.
According to the SED, the end of the war marked the triumphant victory of socialism and
resulted in a society that was supposed to offer equality to all East German workers. They
supposedly achieved egalitarianism with the defeat of fascism. The SED portrayed themselves as
having eradicated greed, anti-Semitism, and racism from the East, and that these problems were
now purely an issue in the West. One of the ways that the SED perpetuated this narrative was
through memorials, and one of the most prominent memorials was the Buchenwald memorial.
The Buchenwald memorial commemorates the victims of the Buchenwald concentration camp. It
is located at the site of the former Bismarck Tower on Ettersberg Hill, which the SS used as a
mass grave of prisoners who they murdered near the end of the war. At the memorial, visitors
walk down a steep set of stairs toward the graves. Sculptures there depict the seven years of the
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camp, focusing on communist resistance. After walking past the graves, visitors walk up a
staircase towards the Tower of Freedom, where a sculpture depicts prisoners standing up against
their fascist guards.96
At the dedication of the new memorial, the minister president of the GDR, Otto
Grotewohl, said that it should represent not just the memory of the “horrible Nazi dictatorship”
and “remembrance for the deaths of our great fighters,” but that it should also “provide us with a
renewed warning” and remind us to not “surrender our fight against every form of inhumanity
too soon, until we have removed every form of fascism in every country and for all time.”
Grotewohl’s words show the ideological focus of the memorial. The memorial focuses on the
story of Ernst Thälmann, who was killed by the Nazis at Buchenwald. Thälmann was born in
Hamburg in 1886. He joined the German Communist Party (KPD) in the 1920s and was active in
several labor protests in Hamburg. He became the leader of the KPD in 1925 and played a
significant role in joining KPD interests with Soviet interests. The KPD portrayed him as “the
only alternative” to Nazi dictatorship and years of oppression and warfare.97 A few weeks after
Hitler was named chancellor, Thälmann was arrested. He spent the next eleven and a half years
in prison until he was murdered under Hitler’s direct order in August 1944.
The Buchenwald memorial “elevated Thälmann’s legacy to one of national
importance.”98 Prominent East German communists would mention his name in speeches,
proclaiming that ‘Ernst Thälmann is among us!’ Thälmann’s image became prominent in East
German film and art as well. Multiple films were produced about Thälmann, such as ‘Ernst
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Thälmann—Son of his Class’ and its sequel, ‘Ernst Thälmann—Leader of his Class.’99 The
Buchenwald memorial and the elevation of Thälmann’s legacy show how the SED depicted the
relationship between socialism and capitalism. According to Jon Berndt Olsen, “the state needed
the public to view the communists as the greatest victims so that their triumph (the creation of
the GDR) would be even more heroic.”100
In stark contrast to the West, East Germans were less reluctant to discuss German
suffering in the war. In fact, acknowledgement of this suffering was part of the SED’s strategy to
foster an East German national identity. After all, if communists were the greatest victims of the
Nazis, and if East Germans are supposed to be communists, then it makes sense for the SED to
commemorate German suffering as part of the official narrative. Specifically, the bombing of
Dresden on February 13-14, 1945, obtained a special place in East German memory. According
to Jörg Arnold, the destruction of Dresden “served state-sponsored propagandists as a powerful
symbol of both ‘imperialist’ atrocity and German victimhood.”101
While it was true that communists were brutally murdered at the hands of the Nazis, the
focus on exclusively communist victims resulted in racism and antisemitism being swept under
the rug. Since the SED believed that economics and class consciousness had been the root of the
rise of National Socialism, the official narrative predicted that racism and antisemitism would
naturally disappear in an egalitarian socialist society. For most of the GDR’s history, the radical
right played a minimal role, but this was mainly due to the state’s efforts to suppress all forms of
political dissent. However, by the 1990s, the commemoration of the bombing of Dresden had
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grown into a space for the radical right to spread their ideas and played a role in their expansion
in the years following reunification. According to Weisskircher, “neo-Nazis have commemorated
the anniversaries of the Allied air raids against the city—in the late 2000s sometimes bringing
together more than 5,000 followers.”102 The activity of the radical right contributed to the
founding of PEGIDA in Dresden, which was closely related to the success of the AfD in the
2017 election.

The Police State
The legacy of the GDR is not limited to the memory of World War II. Rather, East
Germans had to deal with a second authoritarian regime. East Germans had to deal with a state
that intruded into their personal life and freedoms on a daily basis. The memory of the
authoritarian police state today influences East Germans’ attitudes towards democracy and the
function of government, which are significantly different from the West. The police state of the
GDR was infamously known for its invasion into the private lives of its citizens. The Ministry
for State Security (MfS) went to extreme measures to control its population and crackdown on
all forms of dissent. More commonly known as the Stasi, it intended to “crush the slightest
opposition.” Everyone would fear the Stasi so that the GDR looked like a “quiet land.”103 The
MfS grew out of the Komissariat 5 (K-5), which was formed in 1947 to arrest political opponents
of the Soviet occupation. According to Edward Peterson, the K-5 “arrested so many enemies that
concentration camps had to be opened or reopened” and “acquired a reputation as bad as that of
Stalin’s Secret Police and worse than that of the Gestapo,” the secret police under the Nazi
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regime.104 On February 8, 1950, the MfS was officially created in the image of the Soviet Secret
Police, and the Soviets took great care to ensure that the Stasi was managed up to their standards.
While the SED attempted to glorify the MfS with the motto of ‘the sword and the shield
of the Republic,’ for most people it became a source of fear and an invasion of privacy. It ended
up expanding its involvement “far beyond the normal service of a Secret Police” and even
attempted to “compel production and technological advance.”105 The need for such an expansive
role for the MfS came partly as a result of economic competition with the West. In the 1950s, the
‘economic miracle’ of West Germany widened the gap in living standards between the two
countries and caused approximately two million East Germans to move to the West in the 10
years before the Berlin Wall was built in 1961.106 The head of the SED at the time, Walter
Ulbricht, believed that the continuation of an open border with the West would cause the country
to collapse internally. The MfS was supposed to shut down dissent by ensuring that citizens
could not escape while simultaneously compelling businesses to be more productive in the hopes
of maintaining reasonable economic standards.
The MfS grew steadily and eventually reached 100,000 full-time employees.107 Including
the ‘unofficial informers’ (inoffizielle Mitarbeiter), who were not formally employed by the MfS
but still relayed information to them, this meant that there was approximately one Stasi or Stasi
informant for every 66 individuals.108 Everyone living in the GDR always had to assume that
they were being watched or heard by the Stasi at all times, and that if they said or did anything
that the state did not approve of, they could face harsh consequences. According to Peterson, “it

104

Peterson, 19.
Peterson, 30.
106
Peterson, 4.
107
Peterson, 13.
108
Peterson, 26.
105

52
penetrated dissident circles so effectively that every fourth member seemed to be in its pay.”
Florian Henckel von Donnersmark shows the extent of this fear in the 2006 film, ‘The Lives of
the Others’ (das Leben der Anderen).109 The film features a young couple, the playwright Georg
Dreyman and actress Christa-Maria Sieland, who are placed under surveillance. The Stasi
official who leads the operation, Gerd Wiesler, bugs their apartment and spends his time
listening to their intimate conversations and trying to find evidence that Dreyman is conspiring
against the state. He begins as a remarkably unsympathetic character, but as the film progresses,
he comes to realize how the surveillance is slowly ruining their lives. One of the themes of the
film is the arbitrary nature of the surveillance and the overreach of the state into personal affairs.
The legacy of the GDR is constantly in the background of East German politics, and East
Germans often feel like this history is misunderstood by West Germans, who may not have
personal connections to it. The GDR’s narrative of the West, the refusal to acknowledge racism
in East German society, and the oppressive police state have contributed to the skepticism that
East Germans feel about the role of government and the role of democracy, which is one area
where East Germans today still significantly differ in opinion from West Germans. This is
especially visible in the COVID-19 pandemic in debates over lockdowns, masking, and
especially the potential for a vaccine mandate. During the pandemic, eastern states have seen
much higher levels of opposition to precautionary measures such as these, in part because of
higher levels of suspicion that stem from the legacy of the GDR.
On one hand, German reunification brought together East and West Germans who shared
the same ethnicity, spoke the same language, and shared similar cultural values. On the other
hand, their histories had diverged directly following the traumatic experiences of World War II,
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which would come to shape German culture and politics for the foreseeable future. East Germans
had been exposed to a very different understanding of German crimes in the Nazi era. On top of
this, they had essentially transitioned from one totalitarian government to another. This meant
that—although suffering under the GDR was by no means comparable to that during the Third
Reich—East Germans now had a second difficult history to unpack. The legacy of the GDR
provides an explanation as to why concepts of national belonging and democracy tend to be
viewed differently in the East and the West, as well as why the racism of the AfD is met with
less opposition and less skepticism in the East. However, to get the full picture of eastern
Germany today, the legacy of the GDR must be viewed in combination with the legacy and
aftermath of reunification.
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Chapter 4: The Legacy of Reunification
Thirty years after reunification, a significant socioeconomic divide persists between East
and West Germany. In 2018, the average income in the East was 32,108 euros per year compared
to 42,971 in the West. However, the divide is even more visible through the concentration of
political and economic power in the West. Lars Rensmann finds that 464 of Germany’s 500
biggest corporations have their headquarters in the West, while only 36 are located in the East.
Additionally, Germany’s cultural and academic elite are still largely Western. No university
president grew up in the East. All in all, only 1.7 percent of top-level leadership positions in
administration, politics, and the economy are held by East Germans. On an individual level, life
satisfaction is consistently lower in the five eastern states, but Rensmann notes that there are
signs of convergence. Most importantly perhaps, surveys show that East Germans still tend to
think of themselves as second-class citizens in relation to the West.110 This perception is without
doubt influenced by political groups such as the AfD and PEGIDA, who take advantage of
Eastern discontent in order to fuel their own support. However, it is also partly a result of the
process and effects of reunification on the East.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the relationship between socioeconomic status and the AfD is
complicated. A lower socioeconomic status does not strongly correlate with a tendency to vote
for the AfD. However, as a whole, the knowledge that the East German economy still lags
behind the West can contribute to the appeal of the populist radical right, even if those to whom
it appeals are not necessarily personally members of the lowest socioeconomic class. Especially
when combined with the cultural and historical legacy of the GDR, socioeconomic status is yet
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another factor that allows the AfD to attract support in Eastern Germany. However, because of
the indirect effect it has on support for the AfD, I prefer to refer to socioeconomic factors under
the umbrella term of the legacy of reunification. This term makes socioeconomic factors less
personal and more part of the East German identity and experience. It also places a greater
emphasis on the problems with the reunification process itself as opposed to the socioeconomic
status of individuals. I argue that the reunification process contributed to the distrust in the
political system that we see today and to support for the AfD in the East.

Overview of Reunification
In the 1970s and 80s, reunification was not really on most people’s minds. However,
when Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the Soviet Union relaxed its grip on the Eastern bloc
and events started progressing rapidly in previously unexpected directions. The first noticeable
changes in the GDR began as other Eastern bloc states began to open up their borders, allowing
the opportunity for many East Germans to leave the struggling economy of the GDR in search of
better economic opportunities. In the summer and early autumn of 1989, thousands of East
Germans were fleeing their homeland. According to Anna Saunders, “once Hungary officially
opened its borders in September, the stream of refugees became a veritable flood.”111
October saw the first large-scale demonstrations against the SED. From this point on for
about a year, events progressed at an astounding and unpredictable speed. Weekly Monday
demonstrations began in Leipzig on October 9, two days after the GDR’s state-run fortieth
anniversary celebration. After people saw that the state was not cracking down hard on
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demonstrations, the Monday demonstrations grew quickly. The following week, around 150,000
people gathering in Leipzig on October 16. Two days later, the Politbüro (the policy-making
committee in the GDR) responded to the protests by dismissing Erich Honecker as Secretary
General of the SED. He was replaced by Egon Krenz, who promised a coming Wende—German
for a major reversal or change. From this point on, it was clear that the GDR would be
undergoing major reforms, but it was still unclear what those reforms would be. In the first week
of November, the entire East German government resigned. The new government suddenly lifted
the travel ban to the West and on November 9, the Berlin Wall was opened, which millions of
East Germans immediately took advantage of by visiting West Germany. As many as 2,000 per
day stayed in the West. Saunders writes that during this time, “the severity of the country’s
economic and environmental problems rapidly became evident, and it was clear that the state
would need more than a simple overhaul of the system in order to survive in the long term.”112
It was only after the GDR’s first elections on March 18, 1990, that reunification became a
certainty. In these elections, the CDU-backed ‘Alliance for Germany’ party won decisively with
48.1 percent of the vote, more than twice as many votes as either the PDS (Party of Democratic
Socialism, formerly the SED) or the SPD. This result “effectively endorsed the rapid
reunification process.”113 In the West meanwhile, chancellor Helmut Kohl had been pushing for
a swift reunification. According to Schweiger, his approach “was mainly targeted towards
containing the growing tide of East Germans emigrating towards the West by bringing the DMark as well as West Germany’s social market economy and the welfare state to them.”114 One
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of the most important aspects of this plan was the introduction of the D-Mark as the currency to
replace the Eastern Ostmark. This exchange was done on a 1:1 basis, which economists criticized
as irresponsible, since the real exchange value of the Ostmark was around 0.12. This meant that
East Germans benefited economically from the currency transition, at least more than they would
have if the real exchange rate had been used. Kohl also planned to invest heavily in Eastern
infrastructure in order to bring the Eastern standard of living up to that of the West.115 Later that
summer, on August 23, the GDR parliament voted for reunification. Germany was officially
unified on October 3, 1990, almost exactly a year after the beginning of the widespread protests
in the GDR.
Saunders finds that this eventful year was an extremely intense, emotional, and confusing
time for many East Germans, especially for younger generations. Before the elections on March
18, many young people had hoped for democratic socialism, a system between capitalism and
communism. One poll of young East Germans found that 88 percent of them supported a
“reformed, socialist GDR,” whereas only 5 percent supported a capitalist solution.116 The
demonstrations had provided many young East Germans with a newfound identity and even
patriotism, as they felt that for the first time, they could make a difference in the direction of the
country. Saunders notes that “the concept of patriotism radically changed during these months,
for once the power of the SED was broken, loyalty to the GDR no longer also entailed loyalty to
the party,” which made an enormous difference in East Germans’ relationship with their home
country.117
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Attitudes toward the West were changed by this new East German patriotism. Many
young East Germans who previously felt indifferent toward West Germany felt annoyed at
Western presence in the protests because they felt that the GDR was their country to fight for and
change, while West Germans had no experience living there and no understanding of their
problems. On the other hand, East Germans who favored reunification usually did so out of
practical considerations. They may not have thought of the transition to capitalism as ideal, but at
the same time, they saw it as the most practical way to try to solve the economic problems of the
East. At the same time, many people had friends or relatives who had moved to the West in the
past year, and reunification felt like a natural way to keep families together. In the end, the
victory of the Alliance for Germany confirmed that these practical concerns won out over the
more idealistic desire for democratic socialism.
Wolfgang Becker’s film ‘Goodbye Lenin’ portrays these complicated emotions
remarkably. The main character is a young man who participates in the protests prior to the fall
of the Berlin Wall, and while his mother feels a connection with the GDR, he had never cared
much for it previously. However, over the course of these few months, he develops a personal
connection with the country. One line in the film captures this sentiment above all. The narration
reads, “the GDR that I created for my mother became more and more the GDR that I would have
wished for.” The film shows how, for many East Germans who had previously never felt a strong
identity with the GDR, the year that preceded reunification was a time when they had first
discovered this identity, only to lose it when reunification actually occurred.
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Protest Voting in the Aftermath of Reunification
Reunification had many positive effects on the lives of average East Germans. Today, 70
percent of people living in the former East Germany say they consider themselves ‘winners
rather than losers’ of reunification.118 To some extent, the practical considerations that led to East
Germans’ to vote for reunification materialized. In unified Germany, East Germans now enjoyed
political freedom, democracy, and freedom of movement. Economically, they also benefited
from access to a much stronger currency with the D-Mark. The government now had the funds
and the political will to invest in the infrastructure in Eastern cities as Kohl had promised. Today,
happiness reports show positive trends in eastern Germany despite the socioeconomic disparity
with the West. Lars Rensmann summarizes that “there is a widespread sense that life is better
since unification and people got ahead, yet citizens are not where they wanted to be and feel
somewhat stuck in the wrong lane of Germany’s economic traffic.”119
With all the problems that reunification solved, it also brought many challenges to the
new Bundesländer. Much of this was attributable to the Treuhand Commission, the organization
responsible for economic restructuring and integration of the East. According to Schweiger, “the
legacy of the Treuhand turned out to be fatal for the social fabric of eastern Germany.”120 The
Treuhand was responsible for assessing the competitiveness of eastern firms, which had formerly
been owned by the state, and assisting them in restructuring to compete with Western firms. This
meant that Eastern firms were privatized. In spite of, or perhaps because of the Treuhand,
Eastern companies were unable to compete due to the more-established production capacity of
Western companies. Additionally, Western consumers already tended to be better off
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economically than Eastern consumers, which gave Western companies another insurmountable
advantage. Within a few years, many Eastern companies were bought and often shut down by
western competitors. The results of the Treuhand’s policies caused many Easterners to feel a lack
of representation under their new government. Schweiger writes that it “contributed to the
perception that the East is essentially governed by West Germans.”121 Some have even referred
to reunification as strongly as ‘colonization of the East.’122
The result of the closure of so many eastern businesses was mass unemployment in the
East over the following years. Between 1990 and 1994, around 2.6 million East Germans lost
their jobs. This would lead to the perception of East Germans—often of middle-aged men, who
are the AfD’s primary voting demographic—as having “broken biographies” and “devalued
careers.”123 As would be expected, these changes had a strong impact on Eastern communities.
One example of a community that quickly deteriorated in value after reunification was Lütten
Klein in Rostock, which “quickly transformed from a socially integrated area to a neighborhood
of the left behind.”124 Interestingly, this district neighbored Rostock-Lichtenhagen, where the
violent anti-immigration riots of 1992 took place as described in the previous chapter. Only two
years after reunification, this example already shows a relationship between the legacy of
reunification and the resort to right-wing extremism as a way to express this anger.
Many East Germans expressed dissatisfaction with the political system with a protest
vote at the ballot box. One definition of a protest party comes from Grigore Pop-Eleches, who
defines it as “an electoral option driven less by the positive appeal of the chosen party’s
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ideological/policy platform than by the rejection of other possible political choices.”125 Protest
voters in the 1990s were attracted mostly to the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). The PDS
was a successor of the SED, the former governing party of East Germany. It seemed like the
PDS was on the decline when it received only 11.1 percent of the vote in the East in the 1990
Bundestag elections. However, it was much more successful in the following years, such as in
local elections in the eastern half of Berlin in 1992 and in Brandenburg in 1993. In the 1994
Bundestag elections, the PDS “nearly doubled its vote share in the east to 19.8 percent and
garnered support among voters that held a negative view of the economic situation, lacked
confidence in the country’s political institutions, and were more disillusioned with politics than
other eastern voters.”126 However, it was not long before the right also began to appeal to protest
voters. The DVU would have their best results in the East beginning in 1998 when they earned
12.9 percent of the vote in the regional election in Saxony-Anhalt. Since then, radical right
parties, such as the DVU, NPD, and recently the AfD, have consistently performed better in the
East than in the West.
In the 2000s, new policies and reforms provided East Germans with still more reasons to
resent the government. Economically, many were still struggling. Unemployment was already
high at 18.7 percent in 2000 and rose to over 20 percent from 2003 to 2005. Additionally, the
average Eastern income was still only 80 percent of the West.127 However, the neoliberal
economic reforms passed by the SPD-Green coalition government under chancellor Gerhard
Schröder only made things worse in the eyes of many East Germans. In particular, the Hartz IV
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reforms led to protests across Germany, especially in the East. Hartz IV limited unemployment
benefits, and since unemployment in the East was already so high, it had a disproportionate
impact there. The idea was to incentivize unemployed people to get back to work, but of course,
this was not always a realistic expectation. On the technical side of the law, Walwei criticizes
some of the calculations for their failure to accurately calculate the needs of families and
individuals, arguing that Hartz IV failed to proportionally assess people’s assets when
determining whether they were eligible for benefits.128 Walwei proposes that assets should be
calculated with less strict criteria, side jobs should be calculated at a lower percentage rate,
employment history should be considered and favor those with long-term employment history,
and more opportunities for tax exemption should be given.
Regardless of the technical problems with Hartz IV, the impression that most East
Germans had of it was that it was working against their interests. The Hartz IV reforms brought
about a return of the Monday demonstrations in the summer of 2004. The Monday
demonstrations drew a direct comparison between anti-establishment sentiment in the Eastern
states and the pro-democracy protests of 1989 that brought reform to the GDR and eventually
resulted in reunification. The protests were backed by trade unions, anti-globalization activists,
self-help groups, and left-wing political parties.129 The protesters were disproportionately males
in their early 50s, many of them were unemployed or economically insecure, and many of them
were politically left-wing. Protesters gathered in over 200 German cities and towns, and in
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Leipzig, crowds reached 20,000 to 30,000 by August 30, 2004. Because Hartz IV mostly
affected the East due to its higher unemployment rate, protests in the East were much bigger.130
The demonstrations also revived support for the PDS, which had previously been in
decline due to the perception that it had become too much like the established parties. It had
failed to cross the 5 percent threshold in the 2002 federal elections, but the first few months of
protests in 2004, the PDS had jumped to 7.5 percent nationally. However, yet another party
formed in opposition to the Hartz IV reforms: the Electoral Alternative for Jobs and Social
Justice (WASG). This party was formed by trade union officials and left-wing Social Democrats
who were angry with the SPD over Hartz IV. The PDS and WASG formed an alliance in the
2005 federal election, where they would win 8.7 percent of the vote nationally, with 25.3 percent
of the eastern vote. The radical-right NPD also benefited from protest voting in the 2005
election, receiving 8 percent of the vote in the East. Sixty percent of NPD voters chose the party
specifically because of its opposition to Hartz IV. David Patton writes that “workers and
unemployed, above all in eastern Germany, turned to left-wing and right-wing protest parties in
the 2005 federal election.”131 In 2007, the PDS and WASG officially merged to form the Left
Party. The Left, which was driven by protest voters, would transform German politics into a fiveparty system. The Left would have its best election result in 2009 after the 2008 financial crisis,
where it won 11.9 percent of the vote nationally and 28.5 percent in the East.
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The AfD as a Protest Party
By the AfD’s first national election in 2013, the Left Party was already beginning to lose
its appeal to eastern protest voters. It quickly became perceived as part of the eastern political
establishment and lost credibility as a protest party.132 Therefore, when the AfD arrived on the
scene, it was able to fill a gap in the German political system. In the AfD’s first election in 2013,
they criticized the Alternativlosigkeit of Merkel’s government after Merkel had explicitly said
that there was no alternative to the bailout of the Euro crisis. The premise of the party as an
‘Alternative’ references the ‘electoral alternative’ of the short-lived WASG party. In 2017, which
was the AfD’s first national electoral success, it drew votes from all other parties. However, in
proportion to the size of the other parties, it drew the most from the Left. On the surface, this is a
surprising fact, since the parties should theoretically lie on opposite sides of the political
spectrum. Despite this, the populist style of the Left and the AfD is remarkably similar,
especially in their criticism of the political establishment and their preference for more direct
democracy. Additionally, both parties are skeptical of globalization, the EU, and free trade
agreements, and both parties have a friendlier position toward Russia.133 Most importantly
perhaps, both parties appeal specifically to the Eastern identity and issues.
In the 2021 election, the AfD continued to draw support from former Left Party voters.
While in this election, the AfD lost votes to most parties, the only major party that it drew votes
from in this election was the Left. Approximately 110,000 people who voted for the Left in 2017
voted for the AfD in 2021.134 While the AfD had a stable election result, the Left failed to break
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the 5 percent threshold and is only represented in the 20th Bundestag due to its performance in
three specific districts. That being said, it is important to note that the Left lost votes to every
party in the 2021 election, especially to the SPD (-590,000) and to the Greens (-470,000).135
It is safe to conclude that the AfD has overtaken the Left as the primary protest party of
eastern Germany. Exit polls from the recent 2021 federal election show that AfD voters say that
their vote is motivated by a disdain for the political establishment. A Tagesschau poll from 2021
shows that 86 percent of AfD voters say that the AfD is the only party with which they can
express protest against the establishment.136 However, protest is not the only thing motivating
AfD voters, as polls show that most AfD voters clearly agree with the party’s stances on
controversial issues. The same poll found that 95 percent of AfD votes agree with the AfD’s
stricter immigration control, and 97 percent agree that the AfD “understands better than the other
parties that many people don’t feel safe anymore.”137 A sizeable majority of voters also agreed
with the party’s position on the pandemic, with 77 percent agreeing that it was good that the AfD
began to oppose Covid restrictions early.
The connections of the AfD with the Left party and with right-wing ideology are
complex. As discussed in Chapter 2, right-wing ideology is often viewed as one of the most
important predictors of a vote for the AfD. However, it seems that this statement requires a
caveat, namely that right-wing AfD voters today did not necessarily always identify with a rightwing ideology. Recall that at the demonstrations against Hartz IV, most protesters identified with
a left-wing ideology, and that these protests were instrumental in the formation of the Left Party,
many of whose voters proceeded to vote for the AfD. Of course, it is difficult to say whether
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right-wing AfD voters today are the same people as the left-wing anti-Harz IV demonstrators in
2004, but there is likely to be at least some overlap. This relationship shows that in East
Germany, the anti-establishment politics are sometimes more important than the theoretical
political ideology. It also shows that, while the East has had a long history of left-wing protest
voting, right-wing protest voting has taken over. This could be due to a generational shift, or it
could be the result of pent-up anger causing people to resort to right-wing politics, which allow
them to take out their anger on immigrants and minorities.
To summarize, there is still a significant socioeconomic divide between eastern and
western Germany, but on an individual level, the relationship between socioeconomic factors and
a vote for the AfD is not clear-cut. This is not surprising, since the AfD does not talk much about
individual welfare. However, the fact that this divide still exists and is partly a result of the
reunification process is a driving factor of the AfD vote and plays an important role in the history
of eastern German politics. The Hartz IV reforms of 2004 further entrenched the idea in the East
that the Western-dominated government and economic institutions were not working for them,
and the Left Party, formed partially by former PDS members, grew out of this discontent. The
appeal of the Left and the appeal of the AfD as protest parties are intricately linked, and there is a
clear connection between the legacy of reunification and the success of the AfD.
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Conclusion: The Future of the AfD
With the AfD’s entrance in the Bundestag after the 2017 election, the German political
landscape was changed for the foreseeable future. In the few years since its creation, the party
radicalized quickly. When it was founded in 2012, it focused almost purely on opposition to
Merkel’s bailout of debtor countries in the financial crisis. For the first couple years of its
existence, it advocated primarily for the abolition of the Euro as a continent-wide currency and
supported euroskeptic ideas, but it was not yet considered a radical right party. However, by the
2017 election it had radicalized and shifted its emphasis toward anti-immigrant and anti-Islam
sentiment. In this election, it became the most successful radical right populist party that postwar
Germany had ever seen. One thing that was especially notable about the AfD’s success was the
disproportionate number of votes it received in former East Germany. It is important to note that
the AfD was also more successful in the West than most other radical right parties had ever been,
and that the majority of its support in raw numbers comes from the Western states due to the
West’s much higher population. However, this does not change the fact that, in proportion to the
population, the AfD performed much more strongly in the East.
The party’s success in the East drew attention to the fact that significant ideological and
socioeconomic divides still persist in eastern Germany. The extent to which ideological and
socioeconomic factors played a role in the motivations of AfD voters became a highly contested
topic in academic discourse. Some argued that right-wing ideology and anti-immigrant sentiment
were the main drivers of the AfD vote in the East and provided evidence that socioeconomic
factors, such as current income level, education level, or employment status, had little to no
impact on the likelihood of a vote for the AfD. Others were not satisfied with this conclusion and
found that socioeconomic factors play a less direct role in a vote for the AfD, albeit a complex
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one. They argued that, while current socioeconomic factors were not significant motivators, past
employment status and expectations for the future did play a role in the decision to vote AfD.
In this thesis, I have taken a different approach that attempts to incorporate the source of the
ideological divide as well as the complexities of the socioeconomic divide. In order to achieve
this, I have examined the relationship between two historical legacies and the AfD: the legacy of
the GDR and the legacy of reunification. I have focused on three aspects of the legacy of the
GDR: the radical right in the GDR; the differences in memory culture between the East and
West; and the police state of the GDR. Anti-immigrant sentiment in East Germany is closely
related to the immigration policies of the East, but also the resurgence of neo-Nazi organizations
in the lead-up to and the aftermath of reunification. This relates to the memory culture of the
East, which was highly centralized and did not identify racism and antisemitism as causes of the
rise of National Socialism. Lastly, the police state of the GDR severely limited its citizens’
freedoms, and the memory of this contributes to Eastern skepticism of government overreach.
The legacy of reunification is essential in understanding both the relationship of AfD support
to socioeconomic issues and the history of eastern German protest voting that precedes the AfD.
The reunification process itself took place over the course of about a year, beginning with
protests in the fall of 1989. That year was an intense and emotional time for East Germans, many
of whom were eager for reform but not necessarily for unification under a capitalist system.
Reunification seemed to be the most practical option to solve the country’s economic problems.
However, while eastern cities received considerable investment in infrastructure and East
Germans enjoyed new political freedoms, new economic problems arose. Eastern firms struggled
to compete with Western firms, which led to their closure and a sharp rise in the unemployment
rate that would remain significantly higher than that in the West. The Hartz IV reforms of 2004,
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which restricted unemployment benefits and disproportionately impacted the East, brought a
resurgence of protest voting for the newly created Left Party. By 2017, many protest voters in the
East were angry about Germany’s relatively open immigration policies, which they saw as a
danger to German society. This resulted in the AfD’s success as a radical right protest party,
which continued in the 2021 federal election.
The long-term future of the AfD remains unclear, but it will likely continue to radicalize
further, as it has done for the past decade. However, there is likely a limit to how radical it can
get, given that 46 percent of AfD voters in 2021 say that the party is already not doing enough to
distance itself from extreme right positions.138 The party has long been internally divided
between more radical elements and more moderate elements. It was this division that caused the
original founder of the AfD, Bernd Lucke, to leave it back in 2015 after Frauke Petry took over
party leadership. Since then, the radical side of the party has tended to have the upper hand. The
AfD is currently led by Tino Chrupalla and Alice Weidel, who are known for their stances on
immigration as hardliners in the party.139 Earlier this year, Jörg Meuthen, who co-chaired the
AfD after the 2021 election with Chrupalla, resigned as chair because of what he viewed as
rising totalitarian tendencies within the party. Meuthen says that he does not see a way to bring
the party on a more ‘measured’ course.140
Like other right-wing populist movements around the world, the rise of the AfD in German
politics has perplexed and concerned many observers. When the AfD catapulted to over 12
percent of the vote in 2017, it simultaneously became the first radical right party to enter the
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Bundestag and became the third-largest party in Germany. In this thesis, I have attempted to
show that, for many eastern German AfD voters, the party’s appeal is rooted deep in the
historical legacies of the GDR and in reunification. AfD voters are not necessarily more loyal to
the party than voters for other parties, but the aspects of East German identity that have led them
to support the AfD are still strong.
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